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LAY OPINIONS IN NEW YORK
Edith L. Fisch*
Stated simply, the opinion rule requires the ordinary lay witness to
confine his testimony to a report of facts and, in the absence of a probative need, excludes his inferences, conclusions or opinions.'
Until the 1800's the English courts apparently had no rule excluding
the conclusions and inferences of the ordinary lay witness when accompanied by facts obtained by personal observation.2 Early American
courts adopted this view' and objections to opinions arose only when
the witness had no facts on which to predicate his inferences or conclusions.4 "Opinion is no evidence," it was held, "without assigning the
reason for such opinion." 5 Another court formulated the rule in the
following terms:
Mere abstract opinion is not evidence; but ...

any

. .

person conversant

6
on the subject may state facts, and his opinion on these facts.
From these statements it is apparent that the courts aimed, not at
excluding conclusions based on fact, but at insuring the testimonial
competency of the witness. This ancient principle of testimonial
qualification required a witness to speak from his personal observation
and report only what he saw and heard.7 Thus the opinion rule in its
early formulation did not prohibit conclusions and inferences, if based
on fact. What was prohibited was testimony consisting of surmise, conjecture or guess.'
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, page 69, for biographical data.
' Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 49 Am. Rep. 544 (1884), reversing 26 Hun 250
(N.Y. 1882). The words "inference," "conclusion," and "opinion" are used interchangeably to connote reasoning. CHAimERLAYxE, TRL EvmiDENcE § 918 (2d ed. 1936).
For a discussion of the exceptions to the opinion rule see pp. 45-54 infra.
2 KING & PILLINGER, OPINION EviDENcE in ILLINOIs 7 (1942); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1917 (3d ed. 1940); Bozeman, Suggested Reforms of the Opinion Rule, 13 Tmap. L. Q.
296, 299 (1939).
3 7 WIGoORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1917.
4 Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C.C. 580 (C.C.D.N.J. 1820); Harpending v. Shoemaker,
37 Barb. 270 (N.Y. 1862) ; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S.&R. 89 (Pa. 1821).
5 Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S.&R. 89, 94 (Pa. 1821); accord, Beatty v. Gilmore, 16 Pa.
463 (1851); Seibles v. Blackhead, 1 McMul. 57 (S.C. 1840) ; semble, State v. Allen, 8 N.C.
6, 9 (1820).
6 Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates 527, 530 (Pa. 1803).
7 9 HozDswoRTH, HIsTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 211 (1826); TAYER, EVIDENCE AT
Com:ON LAW 524 (1898).
8 Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S.&R. 89, 94 (Pa. 1821) ("But the witnesses' opinion . . .
must not be founded on the hearsay of others, or the oath of others. . . . To give such
latitude as was allowed in this case to a cross examination would be trying a cause, not
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During the middle 1800's the opinion rule underwent a transformation. "Opinion is no evidence without assigning the reason"'" evolved
into an exclusionary principle which asserted that "the opinion of a witness is not evidence."" The objection to opinions in the sense of a surmise or speculation became an objection to the reporting of conclusions
and inferences. It is in this latter sense that the opinion rule is known
and used today. 2 The precise reason for this change is not known.
Wigmore attributes it to "careless usage"; 3 McCormack, to the ambiguity inherent in the word "opinion."' 4 Whatever the cause of the
transition, there is little doubt that the opinion rule has produced more
conflict, confusion and disorder than any other rule known to the law
-of evidence.' 5
Prominent among the various reasons which have been put forth to
justify the. opinion rule is that such testimony invades the province
of the jury. It has been frequently asserted that when a witness reports
conclusions and opinions his judgment is substituted for that of the
jury, which should draw its own conclusions and inferences.'" The funcby the evidence of facts and opinions formed by the witnesses, from their own observation and knowledge, but would be trying it on opinions founded on hypothesis and facts
stated by others, . . .").
9 McCormick, The Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tr.xAs L. REv. 109, 110
(1945).
10 Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S.&R. 89 (Pa. 1821); accord, Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C.C.
580, 587 (C.C.D.N.J. 1820) (". . . mere opinions of the witnesses are entitled to little
or no regard, unless they are supported by good reasons, founded on facts which warrant
them in the opinion of the jury. If the reasons are frivolous or inconclusive, the opinions
of the witnesses are worth nothing.").
11 Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Den. 370, 373 (N.Y. 1847); accord, Dewitt v. Barley, 9
N.Y. 371, 375 (1853); Harger v. Edmonds, 4 Barb. 256, 258 (N.Y. 1848). But see Hallahan
v. New York L.E.&W.R.R., 102 N.Y. 194, 199 (1886). Although the opinion rule
obtains in England, it has not been treated in the strict manner followed here. See
McCormick, supra note 9, at 109.
1.2 Although the opinion rule operates only as to inferences and conclusions, courts
sometimes use the word "opinion" in the sense of *conjecture, surmise, or guess. Marine
Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Willis, 240 App. Div. 176, 269 N.Y. Supp. 204 (4th Dep't 1934);
Blek v. Dgvis, 193 App. Div. 215, 183 N.Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dep't 1920); Voisin v. Commercial Ins. Co., 60 App. Div. 135, 70 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't 1901).
I3 7 WIc.oRE, EvInENCE § 1917.
'4 McCormick, supra note 9, at 110.
Compare Hand, Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 44 (1901) (Hand attributes the origin of the
rule "to a gradual recognition by successive judges of the advantage of curtailing the
trial and simplifying issues by leaving out redundant matter.").
15 See authorities note 23 infra.
16 Harris v. Panama R.R., 3 Bosw. 7, 14 (N.Y. 1858). See also CuRvis, NEw YoRK
LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 521, 533 (1926).
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tion of the jury is thereby usurped and the parties deprived of their
right to a jury trial51
The opinion rule has also been approved as a means of barring
superfluous testimony. 8 This is said to be implicit in those numerous
decisions which exclude the opinions of a witness on matters of common
knowledge. 9 Such testimony is presumably of no value as the jury,
when presented with the facts, can draw the necessary conclusions.2 0
In a few instances the rule has been sanctioned as a means of safeguarding the trustworthiness of testimony, the assumption being that:
Where witnesses testify to facts they may be specifically contradicted,
and if they testify falsely, the are liable to punishment for perjury. But
they may give false opinions without fear of punishment. 21
Other courts, recognizing the frailties of human nature, have expressed
distrust of opinions because they are "much more frequently founded
'22
on prejudices, or biased by our feelings, than we are aware of."

CRITICISM OF THE RULE

Since the last decade of the nineteenth century the opinion rule has
been subjected to severe and frequent attacks by legal authorities.28
The basic objection to the rule stems from the fact that it rests on
the unrealistic assumption that a matter of fact is in opposition to, and
can be clearly distinguished from a matter of opinion. The unrealism
of this position has been thus explained as follows:
17 Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914), reversing 153 App.

Div. 894, 137 N.Y. Supp. 1130 (1st Dep't 1912); McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N.Y. 526,
24 N.E. 812 (1890); Harris v. Panama R.R., 3 Bosw. 7 (N.Y. 1858); Morehouse v.
Matthews, 2 N. Y. 514 (1849); Lincoln v. Railway Co., 23 Wend. 425 (N.Y. 1840).
18 Comments on the Proposed Missouri Evidence Code, 14 Mo. L. REV. 252, 295 (1949).
19 Ibid.
20 CuRTIs, NEW YORK LAW oP EVIDENCE § 360 (1926).
21 Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 49 Am. Rep. 544 (1844), reversing 26 Hun 250
(N.Y. 1882). See also 3 JONEs, CoimrENTARY oN TH LAW Op EVIDENCE § 1242 (2d ed.
1926) (Witnesses so often disregard the truth that if they were permitted to state opinions
"the administration of justice would become little less than a farce."). 9 HoimswoRTir,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 212.
22 Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige Ch. 171, 173 (N.Y. 1828); accord, Mayor v. Pentz, 24
Wend. 668, 675-6 (N.Y. 1840); Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, 161-2 (N.Y. 1837).
23 KING & PsrsGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIs 1-13 (1942); 7 WxciGoE, EVIDENCE
§ 1919; MODEL CODE OP EVIDENCE 198-202 (1942); Bozeman, supra; note 2, at 297, 300
(1939); Dayton, A Program for Legal Reform in the United States, 16 THE CoNsENsus
58 (1931); Comments, 14 Mo. L. REV. 252, 294 (1949). Only a few cases have discussed
the merits or demerits of the opinion rule. For example see Healy v. Visalia etc. R.R.,
101 Cal. 585, 36 Pac. 125 (1894); MacLaren v. Bishop, 113 Conn. 312, 155 At. 210
(1931); Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 241 (1875).
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The demand that the witness "state the facts" is based upon a misconception of the relation between words and things--the relation between
language and reality. Such a demand assumes that "statements of fact"
can have the same cold, hard, objective reality as tangible objects, or
events. It assumes that the distinction between statements of fact and
statements of opinion is as clear and sharp as that between air and water.
It assumes that statements of fact and statements of opinion are in selfevident opposition like yes and no, or Grant and Lee. These assumptions
are false ....

24

It is generally agreed that all statements are in some measure inferences from experience" and in this sense all testimony is opinion evidence.2 The difference between a matter of fact and a matter of
opinion, from a legal point of view, is believed to be not a "difference
between opposites or contrasting absolutes, but a mere difference in
degree with no recognizable line to mark the boundary."27 A matter of
fact does not differ in kind from a matter of opinion. It is merely a
more specific description or a less remote inference.' 9 Because it is impossible to divide statements of fact from statements of opinion by a
bright clear line, the judges have reached different results on the same
question, and the reports contain conflicting2 and sometimes question24

KING & PmILINoaR, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1-2.

25

Hand, supra note 14, at 50; McCormick, supra note 9, at 111.

26 THAYER, A P ImrnuARY T"EATIsE ow EvIDENCE AT

=

CommoN LAW

524

(1898)

("In a sense all testimony to matter of fact is opinion evidence; i.e., it is a conclusion
formed 'from phenomena and mental impressions.").

See also I Wzooa.E, EvmENCE

§ 1919:
We may in ordinary conversation roughly group off distinct domains for "opinion"
on the one hand and "fact" or "kifowledge" on the other; but as soon as we come
to analyze and define these terms for the purpose of that accuracy which is necessary
in legal rulings, we find that the distinction vanishes, that a flux ensues, and that
nearly everything that we choose to call "fact" either is or may be "opinion" or
inference.
See also City of Salem v. Webster, 95 I1. App. 120, 124, aff'd, 192 I1. 369, 61 N.E. 323
(1901) ("Every statement of fact by a witness contains an element of conclusion of
the witness from facts not stated.").
27 McCormick, supra note 9, at 111. See also 7 WIsaoE, EvInENca § 1919:
. . . if we prefer the idea that "opinion" is inference and fact is "original perception"
then it may be understood that no such distinction can scientifically be made, since
the processes of knowledge and the sources of illusion are the same for both.
Cf. MICHAx. & ADLER, NATURE OF JtDICIAL PROor 315-9 (1931).
28 In re Liquors Seized at Auto Inn, Plattsburgh, N.Y., 204 App. Div. 185, 197 N.Y.
Supp. 758 (3d Dep't 1923); See also KINO & PILLINGER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 4;
McCormick, supra note 9, at 111.
29 Lipschitz v. Halperin, 53 Misc. 280, 103 N.Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (statement
as to ownership held fact); Richmond v. Brewster, 2 N.Y. Supp. 400 (N.Y. City Ct.
1888) (statement of ownership held opinion); Reynolds v. Van Buren, 10 Misc. 703, 31
N.Y. Supp. 827 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. County 1895) (statement that "wood was rotten" admitted as a statement of fact); Dugan v. American Transfer Co., 160 App. Div. 11, 145
N.Y. Supp. 31 (2d Dep't 1913) (statement that "the rope was rotten" held inadmissible
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able decisions.3

Objections to the opinion rule have arisen out of the fact that witnesses told to state facts and not opinions usually become baffled and
confused,3 1 and their testimony, warped into the terminology and framework of the opinion rule, is sometimes misleading or inaccurate.3 2 This
is explained in the following comment by the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State:
There is probably no rule of evidence which causes more consternation
to an inexperienced witness than the rule that the witness may not state
his opinion or conclusion. The ordinary witness is unfamiliar with the
rule and its technical meaning and he is confused as to what he is permitted to say and what he is not permitted to say. The result is that a
witness who could make a clear and helpful statement if he were permitted
to testify in the normal way in which he would discuss the matter outside
the court room, gives a confused and dismembered account which may
insome respects be misleading or incomplete. The attempt to force the
testimony of the witness into a fixed legal mould with which the witness
is unfamiliar oftentimes results in the suppression or omission of vital
facts. The presentation of the evidence will be much simplified and clarified by permitting the witness to state what he knows about the transaction in issue in the ordinary way, even though some conclusions or opinions
may be interwoven in his testimony. If any of his conclusions are unsupported by the facts which he observed, this may be brought out on cross
examination, and the effect of the unjustified conclusion destroyed.33
The opinion rule, to the extent that it prevents the jury from "seeing
the facts as the witness saw them,""4 has been charged with obstructing the- search for truth.' One authority has gone so far as to express
as an opinion). Compare with Mosher v. State, 191 Misc. 804, 77 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Ct. Cl.
1948), aff'd, 90 N.Y.S.2d 198 (4th Dep't 1949) (Non-expert witness' testimony that limb
was decayed was an opinion and not warranted by the facts. Reviewing court, however,

allowed statement .to stand for what it was worth.).
30 Brito v. City of New York, 254 App. Div. 896. 5 N.Y.S.2d 515 (2d Dep't 1938)
(Bathing beach not open to public for bathing is not a statement of fact.); Allen v.
Rogers, 70 Hun 48, 23 N.Y. Supp. 1071 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (Question, "Did you at any time
know that A was working for you?" called for an opinion.) ; People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y.
374, 16 N.E. 676 (1888) (Answer to question which of two engines discharged the most
sparks was held to be a statement of fact.); Chandler v. Allen, 20 Hun 424 (N.Y. 1880)
(Statement that partner made repairs amounting to fifty dollars from his own pocket was
a conclusion.).
31 KxNc & PILLINGER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1.
32 United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 693-4, (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
666 (1932). See also Comments, 14 Mo. L. REv. 252, 294 (1949).
3 REP. Comm. ON THE ADMINisTRATiON or JUsTICE N NEW Yopx, Leg. Doc. No. 50,
p. 298 (1934).

ANNUAL REPORT
or
THE JUDIcIAL COUNCIL OF NEW Yo=a 365 (1940).
35 Ibid. MacLaren v. Bishop, 113 Conn. 312, 155 Atl. 210 (1931). But cf. Teerpenning
34 SIxT

v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co., 43 N.Y. 279, 283 (1872).
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his belief that the rule "has done more than any other rule of procedure
to reduce our litigation towards a state of legalized gambling."' 3 6
The claim that opinion evidence usurps the function of the jury has
been waved aside as "a mere bit of empty rhetoric."3 The usurpation
theory assumes that the jury, instead of forming its own conclusions,
will adopt those of the witnesses.3" Legal scholars have pointed out that
the jury is not bound to accept the opinions of a witness, 9 nor will it do
so if it is not satisfied as to the credibility of the witness as well as the
reasonableness of his opinions4
The charge that the opinion rule is necessary to prevent superfluous
testimony and thus save time 4 ' has been met with the countercharge
that such testimony is necessary and expedient in order to present to
the jury a complete and clear picture of what occurred. 42 And, far from
being a time saver, the opinion rule has been accused of prolonging and
increasing the amount of time, money and effort expended on a trial
because of quibbling and often useless disputes about whether a question calls for a witness to state facts or opinions, not to say anything of
the numerous appeals engendered by contested rulings of the trial
judge."
It has also been claimed that, besides all the other defects and disadvantages, little is accomplished by the opinion rule. A skilful lawyer,
by the form of the question, is often successful in circumventing the
rule.4 4 Furthermore, the opinion of a witness is often apparent to the
jury from his answers or from the side on which he testifies. 4' Authorities, convinced that the opinion rule is impractical as well as an obstruction to the attainment of justice, feel that it should be abolished,4 6
36 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1929 (The rule "makes for injustice rather than justice.").
37 Id. § 1920.
38 Levy v. Huwer, 80 App. Div. 499, 81 N.Y. Supp. 191 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 176 N.Y.
612, 68 N.E. 1119 (1903).

39 1 GREEN;LEA, EvIDENcE § 441-b (16th ed. 1899).
40 Note, Opinion Evidence on the Issues before the Jury, 16 N.C.L. REv. 180, 183
(1938). But Cf. KNo & PIEXNGER, OPINION EVIDENCE 3N Iu.INois 337-9 (1942).
41 Hand, supra note 14, at 44; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136, 164 (N.Y. 1837). See
also note 10 supra.
42 SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT or THE JUDICIAL CouNcI.
GREENLEA,

OF' NEw YORE 342 (1940); 1

EvmENcE § 441-b.

43 Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE oP EvDENcE 34 (1942); McCormick, supra note
9, at 114.
44 Bozeman, supra note 2, at 300.
45 LaRue v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 428, 47 N.E. 796, 798 (1847), affirming 91 Hun 635, 36
N.Y. Supp. 1127 (1895).
46 7 WIG-moRE, EVIDENCE § 1929; NINTH ANNUAL REPORT or

NEw YORK 56-7 (1943); REP. Commn.

THE

JUDICIAL CoUNCIL orF

ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEw YORK,
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or at least 'drastically revised, 47 and the legal profession has been criticized for failing to remedy the situation.48 The Judicial Council of the
State of New York was one of the several organizations which recognized the difficulties involved in applying the opinion rule and in 1943
recommended the adoption of the following proposed statute:
A non-expert witness may in the discretion of the court give testimony
in the nature of an inference or opinion, provided, that the facts upon
which such inference or opinion is based have been personally observed
by the witness and are stated by him, if in the opinion of the court they
are capable of being stated, and provided further that no special knowledge, skill, experience or training is required to draw such inference or
state such opinion. 49
The New York Legislature has not as yet enacted any legislation along
these lines.
OPERATION OF THE RULE

The law on the subject of opinion evidence abounds with so many
conflicting decisions that there is scarcely any holding on the subject
Leg. Doc. No. 50, p. 298 (1934); 38 A.B.A. REP. 583 (1938); Bozeman, supra note 2,
at 300; Dayton, supra note 23, at 57-8; Dawes, Evidence-Opinion Evidence on Issues
before the Jury, 16 N.C.L. Rv. 180, 183 (1938).
47 MODEL CODE OF EvmNcE, Rule 401 (1942); McCormick, supra note 9, at 113-5
(1945); Comments, 14 Mo. L. Rv. 252, 296 (1949).
48 Note, 26 ILL. L. REv. 431, 432 (1931).
49 NznTm ANNUAL REPORT or THE Juficmi CouNcm oF NEw YORK 56-7 (1943). The
Council in 1947 withdrew its recommendation of this proposed statute in favor of further
consideration. The Council is now considering the adoption of The Model Code of Evidence
of the American Law Institute. Rule 401 of the Model Code reads as follows:
(1) In testifying to what he has perceived, a witness, whether or not an expert, may
give his testimony in terms which include inferences and may state all the relevant
inferences, whether or not embracing ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of fact,
unless the court finds (a) that to draw such inferences requires a special knowledge,
skill, experience, or training which the witness does not possess, or (b) that the witness can readily and with equal accuracy and adequacy communicate what he has
perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inference or stating inferences, and his use of inferences in testifying will be likely to mislead the trier of
fact to the prejudice of the objecting party. (2) The judge may require that a witness, before testifying in terms of inference, be first examined concerning the data upon
which the inference is founded.
For an earlier draft of the statute proposed in the Ninth Annual Report see the SixTHa
ANNuAL REPORT oF THE JuDicrA , Couucrr. OP NEw YORE 365 (1940). In 1934 the New
York State Commission on the Administration of Justice, sura note 46, proposed the
following rule:
The Court may in any case where the interest of justice will be served thereby,
permit any witness to state his opinion or conclusion based upon his personal
knowledge or observation concerning any matter with respect to which a non-expert
witness is qualified to form an opinion.
See also 29 MAss. L. Q. 5, 7 (1944) where a Committee of the Massachusetts Lawyers'
Institute recommended to the bench and bar consideration of § 401 of the Model Code
of Evidence. See Note, 26 ILL. L. Rxv. 431, 432 (1931) for the text of a bill providing for
the admission of lay opinions which was submitted to the Alabama legislature.
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which may not be met by a contrary one.5 ° This chaotic situation has
been brought about, not only because statements of fact and opinion
can not be sharply distinguished, 5 but because the courts tend to characterize a statement as fact or opinion on the basis of the purpose for
which it is offered. Statements which are indirectly probative of ultimate issues are labelled facts and admitted more readily than those
which closely approach the vital issues.5 2 It has also been stated that
where witnesses tend to make uniform inferences from certain facts the
courts are apt to treat their statements as direct knowledge, whereas
if a statement is a matter of observation but witnesses tend to make
observations differently, then the court is likely to treat the direct
knowledge as opinion.53
It might be supposed that the severe and frequent bombardment
of the opinion rule by legal authorities would be reflected in a more
liberal application of the rule. Yet, although other courts have yielded
to this pressure, 4 the New York courts not only have remained adamant
50 E.g. Vogel v. Montgomery Ward, 275 App. Div. 727, 86 N.Y.S.2d 817 (3d Dep't
1949) ("floor safe," inadmissible as opinion); McDermott v. Third Ave. R.R., 44 Hun
107 (1887), aff'd, 115 N.Y. 670, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (street car could have "passed
safely"-even if opinion, it is admissable because based upon personal observation of
the facts); Knapp v. Smith, 27 N.Y. 281, 84 Am. Dec. 280 (1863) ("possession" not a
conclusion); Arents v. R.R., 156 N.Y. 1, 50 N.E. 422 (1898) ("possession" a conclusion);
Pitchler v. Reese, 171 N.Y. 577, 64 N.E. 441 (1902), affirming 63 N.Y. Supp. 1116 (4th
Dep't 1900) (ownership a fact); Miller v. R.R., 71 N.Y. 380 (1877) (ownership a conclusion). See also cases cited note 29 supra.
51 See pp. 34-38 supra.
52 Compare the following cases where testimony relating to vital issues was excluded
as opinion, Schoellkopf v. McGowan, 43 F. Supp. 568 (W.D.N.Y. 1942) (purpose for which
trusts were established); Brito v. City of New York, 254 App. Div. 896, 5 N.Y.S.2d 515
(2d Dep't 1938) (bathing beach not open to public for bathing); Brown v. St. Vincent's
Hospital, 222 App. Div. 402, 226 N.Y. Supp. 317 (3d Dep't 1928) (testimony that hospital
employed witness, directed, and paid him); Patterson Gas Governor Co. v. Glenby,
4 Misc. 532, 24 N.Y. Supp. 575 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. City & County 1893) (whether a certain
percentage of gas was saved by using a gas governor), with the following cases: Liscomb
v. Agate, 67 Hun 388, 22 N.Y. Supp. 126 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (question whether witness gave
his partner a "correct" statement of his transaction held statement of fact) ; Brinker
v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 108 (1880) (whether proofs of loss were forwarded
as soon as possible held statement of fact). See also CuRns, NEW YORx LAw oF EVIDENCE
§ 522 (1926).
53 Van Ingen v. Mail & Express Pub. Co., 14 Misc. 326, 35 N.Y. Supp. 838 (Ct. C.P.
N.Y. City & County, 1895), aff'd, 156 N.Y. 376, 50 N.E. 974 (1898). See also CuRTis,
op. cit. supra note 52, at § 522; Hand, supra note 14, at 50, n. 1.
54 In the following cases the statements although expressly labelled opinion, were admitted: Parsons v. Fosbee, 80 Ga. App. 127, 55 S.E.2d 386 (1949) (defendant was going
to "block" road with car); Bragdon v. Bruce, 92 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. App. 1950) (Description of deed as recorded differed from the deed as originally executed.).
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but have become increasingly inflexible and illiberal in their application of the rule0 5 Appellate courts, to the extent that they find no
prejudicial error resulted from the admission of the conclusions or inferences of a witness, have to some extent softened the rigors of the
rule. 6
A. Negligence Cases
A large proportion of the cases which deal with the opinion rule
pertain to negligence. The testimony in such cases concerns not only
the direct question of negligence, but also safety, causation and standards of care. At the common law in England opinion evidence on these
matters was permissibleP7 and according to Wigmore the holdings of the
United States courts are "purely a modern excrescence upon the body of
the common law.""8
The New York courts not only prohibit testimony as to negligence, 59
but statements, less directly probative of the ultimate issue, have also
been characterized as conclusions and excluded on the ground that the
jury, when presented with the facts, can make the necessary inferences.6 l Thus a lay witness may not state whether an act, object,
place or condition is safe, 61 or dangerous, 6 2 even though the statement
55 See cases note 52 supra. The fact that the number of reported cases in New York
dealing with the opinion rule in connection with lay witnesses has decreased in the last
two decades may indicate that, although the courts have not yet seen the light, the
members of the bar have recognized the futility of quibbling over whether a statement
is one of fact or opinion. In this connection see 29 MAss. L. Q. 8 (1944) where it is
pointed out that experienced trial lawyers do not always object to testimony given in
ordinary language.
56 Lowery v. Syracuse University, 258 App. Div. 844, 15 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't
1939), aff'd, 282 N.Y. 793, 27 N.E.2d 203 (1940); LaRue v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 428, 47
N.E. 796 (1897); McGean v. R.R., 117 N.Y. 219, 22 N.E. 957 (1889); Dolittle v. Eddy,
7 Barb. 74 (N.Y. 1849); semble, Mosher v. State, 191 Misc. 804, 77 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Ct. Cl.
1948), aff'd, 90 N.Y.S.2d 198 (4th Dep't 1949); House v. Howell, 53 Hun 638, 6 N.Y.
Supp. 799 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
57 7 WIcmROa, EvIDENCE § 1949.
58 Ibid.
59 Crofut v. Brooklyn Ferry Co., 36 Barb. 201 (N.Y. 1862); accord, Sessa v. Shevers
Ice Cream Co., 215 App. Div. 390, 213 N.Y. Supp. 697 (1st Dep't 1929) (driver of Ford
-was not to blame-inadmissable). Cf. Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N.Y.
Supp. 348 (3d Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 596, 171 N.E. 798 (1930) (Extra judicial
declaration of witness that "bus was not to blame," although an opinion was admissable
to impeach testimony of a witness.).
60 CUiRsS, NEW YoRr LAw OF EVIDENCE § 524 (1926).
61 Vogel v. Montgomery Ward, 275 App. Div. 727, 86 N.Y.S.2d 817 (3d Dep't 1949)
(floor safe); Winters v. Naughton, 91 App. Div. 80, 86 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1st Dep't 1904)
(trench safe); Dittman v. Edison Electric' Illumination Co., 87 App. Div. 68, 83 N.Y.
Supp. 1078 (2d Dep't 1903) (belt unsafe) ; McDonald v. State, 127 N.Y. 18, 27 N.E. 358
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be based on facts obtained by personal observation. In line with the
reasoning which excludes conclusions as to the issue of negligence a
passenger may not state whether he had any complaint concerning the
manner in which the automobile was driven as this calls for an expression of opinion concerning the conduct of the driver and not what was
said or done.63 Characterization of conduct by a standard of reasonableness is also prohibited. A witness, therefore, is not permitted to state
whether an object, condition or situation was necessary, 64 or proper.6
Nor may a witness testify that supervision was inadequate.6 Statements pertaining to the cause which produced a particular effect are
also subject to exclusion as opinion and thus testimony that a floor collapsed because of excessive weight,67 or that a weak bank caused the
fall of an object68 have been excluded.
(1891) (bridge safe); Keller v. New York Central R.R., 20 How. Pr. 172 (N.Y. 1861)
(safer act). Contra: McDermott v. Third Ave. R.R., 44 Hun 107 (1887), aff'd, 115 N.Y.
670, 22 N.E. 1126 (1889) (street car could have "passed safely," even if opinion, is admissable because based upon personal observation of facts).
62 Gorman v. City of New York, 184 Misc. 785, 55 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945)
(dangerous) ; Betts v. Village of Gloversville, 56 Hun 639, 8 N.Y. Supp. 795 (Sup. Ct.
1890); Teall v. Barton, 40 Barb. 137 (N.Y. 1863) (dangerous to use dredge without
spark catcher); accord, Oppenheimer v. Harrisetta Holding Co., 188 App. Div. 472, 176
N.Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1919) (stairway faulty); Schmahl v. Albany Brush Co., 61
Misc. 316, 113 N.Y. Supp. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (saw not safely constructed).
63 Dougherty v. Braddock Automatic Music Corp., 98 N.Y.S .2d 514 (3d Dep't 1950).
64 Storms v. City of Fulton, 263 App. Div. 927, 32 N.Y.S.2d 395 (4th Dep't 1942);
Lane v. New York Central R.R., 93 App. Div. 40, 86 N.Y. Supp. 947 (4th Dep't 1904);
accord, Pierce v. Village of Ravena, 264 App: Div. 457, 36 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1942)
(customary qualifications).
65 Schneider v. Second Ave. R.R., 133 N.Y. 583, 30 N.E. 752 (1892), affirming 59 Super.
Ct. 536, 15 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1891).
66 Lowery v. Syracuse University, 258 App. Div. 844, 15 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't 1939)>,
aff'd, 282 N.Y. 793, 27 N.E. 2d 203 (1940); accord, Bacigalupo v. Metropolitan St. Ry.,
36 Misc. 827, 74 N.Y. Supp. 1119 (Sup. Ct. 1902) ("plenty of opportunity" to stop---calls
for a conclusion); Keller v. New York Central R.R., 24 How. Pr. 122 (N.Y. 1861)
("ample" held conclusion).
67 Second United Cities Realty Corp. v. Price & Schumacher Co., 242 N.Y. 120, 151
N.E. 150 (1926), reversing 214 App. Div. 806, 210 N.Y. Supp. 918 (2d Dep't 1926).
68 Winters v. Naughton, 91 App. Div. 80, 86 N.Y. Supp. 439 (lst Dep't 1904); accord,
Zimmerman v. Ullman, 173 App. Div. 650, 160 N.Y. Supp. 81 (1st Dep't 1916) (witness
not permitted to testify that "from looking at the front wheel of deceased's machine it
looked as if he had lost control of it"); Schmahl v. Albany Brush Co., 61 Misc. 316, 113
N.Y. Supp. 768 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (accident could have been avoided by use of a guard);
Wittman v. City of New York, 80 App. Div. 585, 80 N.Y. Supp. 1022 (1st Dep't 1903)
(water which caused ice came from leader); Regner v. Glenn Falls R.R., 74 Hun 202,
26 N.Y. Supp. 625 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (more force than was necessary); Stevens v. Rodgers,
25 Hun 54 (N.Y. 1881) (whether a blow caused deafness). Contra: Dwyer v. Buffalo
General Electric Co., 20 App. Div. 124, 46 N.Y. Supp. 874 (4th Dep't 1897) (flash was
caused by contact of wire with brace held admissable).
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In negligence cases witnesses are sometimes called upon to state
whether they could have heard a bell or whistle if it had been sounded.
This type of testimony has failed to withstand the charge that it constitutes opinion evidence. Until the case of Curtis v. Hudson Valley Railway Company, the courts had held that these statements were not expressions of opinion but statements of fact pertaining to the acuteness
of the hearing of the witness.70 In Curtis v. Hudson Valley Railway
Company, the Appellate Division, placing its decision on the ground
that the general policy of the courts in regard to the opinion rule had
grown stricter, found that such testimony violated the opinion rule.'
This decision apparently settled the problem as it has not been mentioned since. A witness, may, however, testify that he did not hear a
bell or whistle, as negative evidence of this character, although weak,
is held to be competent.

72

B. Legal Relations
Many words used in everyday language have a special meaning in
law. Such words as "own," "employ," "possess," cowe,") "sell" and
"necessary" are familiar examples. The cases are in conflict as to
whether the use of such words constitutes fact or opinion, and thus the
holding of the court can not be predicted with any certainty. It can be
said, however, that when such words are vital to the ultimate issues
there is a probability that the court will regard them as opinion and
not fact." Opinion evidence in this area of the law has been excluded
147 App. Div. 349, 131 N.Y. Supp. 758 (3d Dep't 1911).
Seeley v. New York Central R.R., 8 App. Div. 402, 40 N.Y. Supp. 866 (4th Dep't
1896); Stever v. New York Central R.R., 7 App. Div. 392, 39 N.Y. Supp. 944 (4th Dep't
1896); Casey v. New York Central R.R., 6 Abb. N.C. 104 (1875), aff'd, 78 N.Y. 518
(1876); Renwick v. New York Central R.R., 36 N.Y. 132 (1867).
71 147 App. Div. 349, 131 N.Y. Supp. 758, 762 (3d Dep't 1911).
72 Curtis v. Hudson Valley Ry., 158 App. Div. 373, 143 N. Y. Supp. 383 (3d Dep't
1913), af'd, 213 N.Y.681, 107 N.E. 1075 (1915).
73 Ownership: The following cases held statements as to ownership admissable: Lipschitz v. Halpern, 53 Misc. 280, 103 N.Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Pitchler v. Reese,
171 N.Y. 577, 64 N.E. 441 (1902), affirming 50 App. Div. 621, 63 N.Y. Supp. 1116 (1900);
Muller v. Abramnson, 25 Misc. 520, 54 N.Y. Supp. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1898); Wolf v- Williams,
69 N.Y. 621 (1877); Caspar v. O'Brien, 47 How. Pr. 80, 15 Abb. Pr. 402 (1873). The
following cases excluded such statements: Diefendorf v. Thomas, 37 App. Div. 49, 55
N.Y. Supp. 699 (3d Dep't 1899); Richmond v. Brewster, 2 N.Y. Supp. 400 (N.Y. City
Court 1888); Miller v. R.R., 71 N.Y. 380 (1877). Sold: The following cases excluded
statements that property was "sold": Mardowitz v. Goldberg, 87 N.Y. Supp. 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1904); Nicolay v. Unger, 80 N.Y. 57 (1880). Necessary: Word excluded in the
following cases: Siegel v. 131 W. 58 St. Corp., 150 N.Y. Supp. 630 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1914);
Ivory v. Town of Deer Park, 116 N.Y. 476, 22.N.E. 1080 (1889), affirming 42 Hun 656
(1886); Merritt v. Seaman, 6 N.Y. 168 (1852). Owe: The following cases excluded
19
70
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not as an invasion of the province of the jury, but as an invasion of the
province of the judge.7 4 Such evidence has also been regarded as unnecessary as the judge, having special knowledge, can dispense with the
opinions of lay witnesses.7 5
C.

States of Mind

Evidence relating to the emotional state of another has been excluded
as a violation of the opinion rule. When first up for decision in New
York the court held that such evidence was admissible as an exception
to the general rule.77 For example, the court held that a witness could
testify that one person appeared attached to another. The court argued:
We do not see how the various facts upon which an opinion of the
plaintiff's attachment must be grounded are capable of specification,78so as
to leave it, like ordinary facts, as a matter of inference to the jury.
With the development of a more rigid attitude toward the admission
of opinion evidence, courts have excluded statements characterizing
testimony pertaining to indebtedness: Marino v. Collis, 54 Misc. 581, 104 N.Y. Supp. 747
(Sup. Ct. 1907); Pope v. McGill, 58 Hun 294, 12 N.Y. Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Rehm
v. Weiss, 8 Misc. 525, 28 N.Y. Supp. 772 (N.Y. City Ct. 1894). Possession: In the following
cases testimony as to possession was held inadmissable: Arents v. R.R., 156 N.Y. 1,
50 N.E. 422 (1898); Boyle v. Williams, 1 Misc. 112, 20 N.Y. Supp. 727 (Ct. C.P. N.Y.
City & County 1892). In the following cases such testimony was admitted: Wallace v.
Nadine, 57 Hun 239, 10 N.Y. Supp. 919 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Knapp v. Smith, 27 N.Y. 277
(1863); Parsons v. Brown, 15 Barb. 590 (N.Y. 1853). Employment: The following cases
excluded testimony dealing with employment: Brown v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 222 App.
Div. 402, 226 N.Y. Supp. 317 (3d Dep't 1928); Allen v. Rogers, 70 Hun 48, 23 N.Y.
Supp. 1071 (1893); Sweet v. Tuttle, 41 N.Y. 471 (1856). Contra: Applebee v. Albany
Brewing Co., 58 Hun 605, 12 N.Y. Supp. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1890). Agree: In the following
cases testimony dealing with the word "agreement" was excluded: Rockwell v. Hurst,
13 N.Y. Supp. 290 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. City and County 1891); Case v. Hitchcock, 46 Hun
675, 11 N.Y. St. Rep. 251 (1887); Holler v. Apa, 17 N.Y. Supp. 504 (Ct. C.P. N.Y.
City & County 1892). Contra: House v. Howell, 53 Hun 638, 6 N.Y. Supp. 799 (Sup.
Ct. 1889). Authority: Testimony as to authority was admitted in the following cases:
People v. Mingey, 190 N.Y. -61, 82 N.E.' 728 (1907), affirming 118 App. Div. 652, 103 N.Y.
Supp. 627 (1st Dep't 1907); Knapp v. Smith, 27 N.Y. 281 (1863). In the following
case such testimony was not permitted: Carr v. Prudential Ins. Co., 115 App. Div. 755,
101 N.Y. Supp. 158 (4th Dep't 1906).
74 CuRTis, NEW YORK LAW OF EVIDENCE § 533 (1926).
75 7 WIGmrORE, EvIDENcE § 1952. Wigmore sees in the exclusion of such testimony an
analogy to the custom of primitive Polynesians who placed a taboo on certain words
connected with the name of a dead chieftain. Id. § 1960.
76 See cases note 79 infra.
77 M'Kee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. 355 (N.Y. 1825) (Witness was asked whether it was his
opinion or not that plaintiff was sincerely attached to defendant.); Blale v. People, 73
N.Y. 586 (1878) (whether grasp was friendly or unfriendly).
78 M'Kee v. Nelson, 4 Cow. 355, 356 (N.Y. 1825).
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79

the emotional states of another.
An attempt to justify the stricter
rule has been made by asserting that the former liberal attitude was
necessitated by the fact that the testimony of third persons was the
only mode of proof, as parties to an action were not permitted at that
time to testify in their own behalf.8 °
The prohibition of the opinion rule extends not only to emotional
states but also to motive and intention. A witness, therefore, may not
testify to the motive,81 knowledge, 2 or intention83 of another. Nor may
a witness testify to his own intention or belief8 4 except where the validity
or invalidity of an undisputed act depends on the intent with which
it was done. 8
79 People v. Perrin, 224 App. Div. 546, 231 N.Y. Supp. 557 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 251
N.Y. 509, 168 N.E. 407 (1929) (whether attitude of X to Y was friendly or otherwise
excluded); Pearce v. Stace, 207 N.Y. 506, 101 N.E. 434 (1913) (Witness was not permitted to answer question whether in his opinion plaintiff was attached to defendant.);
People v. Smith, 172 N.Y. 210, 64 N.E. 814 (1902) (Witness was not permitted to state
whether conduct seemed to him to be natural and genuine.); Messner v. People, 45 N.Y.
1 (1871) (question whether "the person was crying for joy or what" held incompetent).
80 Pearce v. Stace, 207 N.Y. 506, 511, 101 N.E. 434, 436 (1913).
81 Western Nat. Bank v. Flannagan, 14 Misc. 317, 35 N.Y. Supp. 848 (Ct. C.P. N.Y.
City & County 1895) (Purpose for which note was delivered calls for a conclusion.);
People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319 (1887) (Witness who was given a roll of
bills said to be for election purposes could not state that he supposed it was "for the
Broadway road" as this is a conclusion as to the inducement for the gift.); Abbott v.
People, 86 N.Y. 460 (1881) (what a man intended when he reached for a wrench held
inadmissable).
82 Major v. Spies, 66 Barb. 576 (N.Y. 1873) (question "Did plaintiff know you had
nothing to do with the labor on the building?").
83 Bogart v. City of New York, 200 N.Y. 379, 93 N.E. 937 (1911), reversing 138 App.
Div. 888, 122 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (2d Dep't 1910) (Testimony of wife that husband expected
to see the auto races is inadmissable as the witness should be asked to describe acts
or statements from which intention or expectation can be determined.); Manufacturers
& Traders' Bank v. Koch, 105 N.Y. 630, 12 N.E. 9 (1887) (Witness may not testify to
intention of another.).
84 Rimes v. Carpenter, 59 Misc. 445, 110 N.Y. Supp. 965 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1908)
(Where the doing of an act is disputed a witness may not give evidence of the operations
of his mind in order to render more probable the doing of an act by him.); Tronbly v.
Seligman, 191 N.Y. 400, 84 N.E. 280 (1907), reversing 116 App. Div. 910, 101 N.Y. Supp.
1147 (3d Dep't 1906) (plaintiff's understanding of who was buyer held inadmissable);
Nicholas v. Ore Co., 56 N.Y. 618 (1874) (for whom did you set up that machinery excluded); Cutler v. Carpenter, 1 Cow. 81 (N.Y. 1823) (A witness may not state his
belief as to the meaning of a conversation.).
85 People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 64 N.E.2d 341 (1945); Dachs v. De Lite Realty Co.,
210 App. Div. 230, 205 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dep't 1924); Noonan v. Luther, 206 App.
Div. 105, 99 N.E. 178 (1921), reversing 142 App. Div. 922, 127 N.Y. Supp. 1134 (3d Dep't
1911); Davis v. Marvine, 160 N.Y. 269, 54 N.E. 704 (1899), reversing 11 App. Div. 440,
42 N.Y. Supp. 322 (3d Dep't 1896); Tracy v. McManus, 58 N.Y. 257 (1874) (motive
of witness charged as co-partner in doing acts capable of construction as partnership
act held admissable).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE

The exceptions to the opinion rule signify the extent to which the
courts have compromised the conflict between the exclusionary principle of the opinion rule and the probative need for such testimony.
The New York courts quickly realized that a firm and inflexible application of the opinion rule was unfeasible, for in many instances it
is "absolutely impossible to separate in words the minute and transient
facts observed by the witness from the inference as to some other fact,
irresistibly connected with the former in his own mind."80 Under these
circumstances opinions are regarded as the best evidence available."7
Cases dealing with the identification of handwriting were among the
first group of cases to recognize an exception to the general rule.88
This exception was soon extended and the exceptions to the general
rule have increased over the years to such a degree that they are now
not only legion, but legion upon legion. In fact, one court has expressed
the belief that:
There is, in truth, no general rule requiring the rejection of opinion as
evidence. A general rule can hardly be said to exist, which is lost to sight
in an enveloping mass of arbitrary exceptions. 89
Before the court will admit lay opinions it must be established that
the facts which constitute the opinion are incapable of description, the
subject matter must be one which does not require expert knowledge,
and the witness must be qualified to give his opinion. These prerequisites will be discussed as specific exceptions are considered.
A.

Mental Condition

In the ecclesiastical" and common law courts of England, 91 lay witnesses were competent to give their opinion on mental soundness if they
were acquainted with the person in question. Early New York courts
also permitted lay witnesses to give their opinions on mental condition
86 Mayor v. Pentz, 24 Wend. 667, 675 (N.Y. 1840); accord, Nellis v. McCarn, 35 Barb.
115,
87
88
89
90

118 (N.Y.1861).
DeWitt v. Barley, 13 Barb. 550, 554 (N.Y.1852).
See pp. 48-51 infra.
Hardy v. Merill, 56 N.H. 227, 241 (1875).
DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N.Y. 340, 349 (1858).

91 Note, 16 TEN'r. L. Rv.243 (1940). In 29 MAss. L. Q. 7, 8 (1944) there is reference
to testimony in a Scotch court where it was sought to prove a person incapable of administering his affairs because of mental incapacity. The witness was asked "'D'ye ken

young Sandy?' 'Browley,' said the witness, 'I've kent him sin' he was a laddie.'
'An' is there anything in the cratur, d'ye thin?' 'Deed,' responded the witness, 'there's
naething in him ava; he wadna ken a coo frae a cauf.'"
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if based upon facts and circumstances within their own personal observation, 92 such evidence being regarded as an exception to the general
rule. 3 The necessity for admitting opinions in this instance has been
explained in Culver v. Haslam:
Apart from the difficulty of restraining a witness from intermingling his
opinions with his testimony, in questions of this kind, there are strong
reasons why he should be permitted to do so, when he discloses the facts
and circumstances within his own knowledge, upon which they are founded. Human language is imperfect, and it is often impossible to describe,
in an intelligible manner, the operations of the mind of another. We learn
its condition only by its manifestations, and these are indicated not alone
by articulate words, but by signs, gestures, conduct, the expression of the
countenance, and the whole action of the man.94
It is true that the courts regarded opinions as unsatisfactory and undependable evidence because of the possibility that they might be
founded on prejudices and bias, but this factor went to the weight of
the evidence and not its competence.0
This was the status of the law on the subject until 1853 when Dewitt
v. Barley9 6 was decided. On the question of the mental imbecility of a
grantor, the court declared that the opinions of lay witnesses were not
competent evidence on the soundness or unsoundness of mind. The
claim of necessity set forth in Culver v. Haslam was repudiated by the
court when it stated:
There is no such insuperable difficulty in describing the mental manifestations which are relied upon in any case to prove insanity as there is
in the cases of personal identity and handwriting. Those manifestations
which usually attend a sound mind are made familiar to all by the intercourse of all classes of men, and the evidence or mental manifestations
which characterize insanity, so far as they fall under the observation of
men generally, are of that character which witnesses can describe and
relate. They generally consist in acts or words and frequently in both
combined; and there is no more difficulty in describing and relating them
to a jury than there is in many other cases where the witness is required
to state the facts and circumstances and is not
permitted to give his
7
opinion upon the conclusion to which they lead.9
92 Culver v. Haslam, 7 Barb. 314 (N.Y. 1849); Stewart's Executors v. Lippinard, 26
Wend. 255 (N.Y. 1841); Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. 207 (N.Y. 1825). Cf. Clark v. Fisher,
1 Paige 171, 173 (N.Y. 1828) ("The evidence of capacity on which the court or jury are
to decide in most contested cases consists in the opinions of witnesses, sometimes with, but
frequently without, the particular facts on which such opinions are founded.").
93 Culver v. Haslam, 7 Barb. 314 (N.Y. 1841); Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige 171 (N.Y.

1828) semble.
94 Culver v. Haslam, 7 Barb. 314, 325 (N.Y. 1841).

95 Ibid. Accord, Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige 171, 173-4 (1928).
96

9 N.Y. 371 (1853), reversing 13 Barb. 550 (N.Y. 1852).
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Having declared that Culver v. Haslam was decided upon an unsound
principle, the court held that its authority was not controlling. The
judgment of the lower court was reversed and a new trial ordered. When
the decision on retrial of the case came up on appeal the statements
of the Court of Appeals in the first Dewitt case on the question of insanity were promptly labelled dicta, as the witnesses had been asked
whether the grantor was capable of managing his affairs and business,
and not whether he was insane." The court conceded that testimony
dealing with this question was inadmissible as it involves opinions on
a matter of law as well as fact. 9 But reverting to the theory of Culver
v. Haslam, the court held that, when the facts are stated as far as possible, opinions as to mental condition are admissible, for it is impractical
"to come to a satisfactory conclusion without receiving to some extent
the opinions of witnesses."' 00
Out of the decisions in these two cases the court in Clapp v. Fullerton,'01 decided in 1866, evolved the present-day rule in regard to testimony pertaining to mental condition. In that case a witness was permitted to testify that a testator was of sound mind. Apparently on the
authority of the earlier case of Dewitt v. Barley, the court found that
the admission of this testimony constituted error, but realizing that this
decision had been repudiated in the second Dewitt case,'10 2 the court developed the hybrid principle that a witness after describing the acts
and declarations of the person whose mental soundness is in question,
may state that they impressed him as rational or irrational. 3 Thus the
dicta in the earlier Dewitt case, in so far as it prohibits a lay witness
97 DeWitt v.-Barley, 9 N.Y. 371, 387 (1853).

But cf. dissent by Denio, J., at 388-98.

98 DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N.Y. 340 (1858).
99 This holding has been accepted. See Hewlett v. Wood, 55 N.Y. 634, 636 (1873). See
also Note, 7 Mo. L. RaV. 60, 67 (1942).
100 DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N.Y. 340, 348 (1858).
101 34 N.Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681 (1866).
102 DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N.Y. 340 (1858).
103 Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681 (1866). The court cited both
opinions in Dewitt v. Barley, 9 N.Y. 371 (1853) and 17 N.Y. 340 (1858), as authority
for its holding. Obviously Judge Porter, who is responsible for the present day rule, was
among the few people who "would not regret to see this court brought in conflict, upon
this important rule of evidence, with the courts of nearly all the States of the Union, as
well as the ecclesiastical courts of England." See DeWitt v. Barley, 17 N.Y. 340, 352
(1858). The rule in Clapp v. Fullerton, supra, was followed in Weinberg v. Weinberg, 255
App. Div. 366, 8 N.Y.S.2d 341 (4th Dep't 1938); People v. O'Donnell, 51 App. Div. 115, 64
N.Y. Supp. 256 (3d Dep't 1900); O'Connell v. Beecher, 21 App. Div. 298, 47 N.Y. Supp. 334
(4th Dep't 1897) (Person whose sanity is questioned may not give his opinion as to
his own sanity.); People v. Burgess, 153 N.Y. 561, 47 N.E. 889 (1897). See also cases
notes 104-7 infra.
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from expressing his opinion on the general question of soundness or unsoundness of mind, has become and still is the law today.'0 4
The rule laid down in Clapp v. Fullerton has been strictly construed.
Thus a witness who described a defendant's condition and appearance
as distinguished from his acts was not permitted to characterize them
as rational or irrational. 5 It is also error for a witness to state that a
person impressed him as irrational, for the rule requires the characterization to relate only to the acts and declarations described.'0 Appellate
courts, aware of the illogical nature of these quibbling distinctions, have
frequently found these errors non-prejudicial. 7
If the law of New York was brought in line with the law of the majority of states, and lay witnesses who have had an opportunity to observe were permitted to state their opinions on mental condition, 0 8
this backdoor method of evading the formula developed in Clapp v.
Fullerton would become unnecessary. The anomalous position of the
New York courts is highlighted by those decisions which permit an
attesting witness to testify to the condition of the testator's mind at the
time he made the will, even though the witness had no other knowledge
of the testator except that derived from his conduct on that occasion.'
B. Handwriting
The frequent absence of a witness to the actual writing of a disputed
paper or signature" has necessitated other means of proving the genure Campbell's Will, 136 N.Y. Supp. 1086 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1912); People
v. Strait, 148 N.Y. 566, 42 N.E. 1045 (1895); Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N.Y. 316 (1884),
reversing 30 Hun 220 (1883), which affirmed 20 Hun 156 (1880); O'Brien v. People, 36
N.Y. 276 (1867) (DeWitt v. Barley, 9 N.Y. 371 (1853) cited).
105 People v. Pekarz, 185 N.Y. 470, 78 N.E. 294 (1906).
1o Paine v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y. 544, 30 N.E. 725 (1892), affirming 60 Hun 578, 14 N.Y.
Supp. 538 (Sup. Ct. 1891); accord, Myer's Will, 184 N.Y. 54, 76 N.E. 920 (1906), reversing
100 App. Div. 512, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1104 (4th Dep't 1905) ("What was the impression these
acts and conversation made on you as to whether they were rational or irrational?" Held
improper); People v. Youngs, 151 N.Y. 210, 45 N.E. 460 (1896) (answer related to person,
not acts). Contra: People v. Packenham, 115 N.Y. 202, 21 N.E. 1035 (1889).
107 Johnson v. Cochran, 159 N.Y. 555, 54 N.E. 1092 (1899), affirming 91 Hun 165,
36 N.Y. Supp. 283 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (witness allowed to characterize conduct in a general
way as irrational); Wyse v. Wyse, 155 N.Y. 367, 49 N.E. 942 (1898), affirming 34 N.Y.
Supp. 1151 (1895) ("What impression did Mr. W's language and conduct make upon
your mind as to the condition of his mind-Was it rational or irrational?"); People v.
Youngs, 151 N.Y. 210, 45 N.E. 460 (1896).
108 2 JoNzs, EvmECNc § 364 (4th ed. 1938).
109 Matter of Coleman, 111 N.Y. 220, 19 N.E. 71 (1888); see Hewlett v. Wood, 55 N.Y.
634, 635 (1873); Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 195 (1866); DeWitt v. Barley, 9 N.Y.
371, 387 (1853).
110 The genuineness of handwriting may be proved by the testimony of a person who
104 In
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ineness of a document. As early as the seventeenth century a witness

who had at some time seen the person in question write was permitted
to testify to the genuineness of handwriting in civil cases,"' and before
the end of the next century such testimony had become common in
criminal cases." 2 During the eighteenth century the rule was enlarged
to permit a witness to state his opinion respecting the genuineness of
handwriting when familiar with the handwriting of a person claimed to
be the writer of a particular paper, even though he had never seen the
person in question actually write."' The rules permitting lay witnesses
to testify to the genuineness of handwriting were adopted by the courts
of this state at an early period" 4 and are now well established princi15
ples.
No hard and fast rules govern the degree of familiarity a witness
must have as to the handwriting of the person in question in order to
be competent to testify to the genuineness of a disputed writing. Experience or ability in regard to identifying handwriting in general need
not be proved and in most cases the witness is held to have sufficient
knowledge if he can recall seeing the person in question write at least
once." 6 But, as in English law," 7 this is not an indispensable presaw the paper or signature actually written; Tarnofker v. Grissler, 108 N.Y. Supp. 696
(Sup. Ct. 1908).
111 9 HODSWORTH,
112

HisTORY

or"ENGLISH LAW 213 (1926).

Ibid.

113 It appears that this evidence was admissable only if there was no one available who
had seen the person in question write and it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth
century that this evidence was admitted unconditionally. See Holdsworth, op. rit. supra
note 111, at 213. See also People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.RA. 193
(1901).
114 Titford v. Knott, 2 Johns. 214 (N.Y. 1801); Jackson v. Van Deusen, 5 Johns. 144
(N.Y. 1809); Johnson v. Daverne, 19 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1821); see DeWitt v. Barley, 13
Barb. 550, 554 (N.Y. 1852).
115 Ely v. Stone, 173 Misc. 117, 17 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940); accord,
In re Thompson's Will, 189 Misc. 68 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Surr. Ct. Monroe County 1947),
aff'd, 81 N.Y.S.2d 923 (4th Dep't 1948) (Witness must profess to know handwriting of
person in question.); Farrell v. Manhattan Ry., 83 App. Div. 393, 82 N.Y. Supp. 334
(1st Dep't 1903) (A knowledge of the handwriting of the person whose signature is sought
to be proved is necessary.). Opinion evidence as to the genuineness of a signature made
by a cross is inadmissable. In re Corcoran's Will, 145 App. Div. 129, 129 N.Y. Supp.
165 (4th Dep't 1911).
116 Matthew v. Hill, 165 App. Div. 672, 151 N.Y Supp. 101 (3d Dep't 1915); Tarnofker
v. Grissler, 108 N.Y. Supp. 696 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Hammond v. Varian, 54 N.Y. 398
(1873); Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 14 N.Y. 439 (1856); Jackson v. Van Deusen, 5 Johns.
144 (N.Y. 1809). Cf. People v. Corey, 148 N.Y. 476, 42 N.E. 1066 (1896) (Witness "should
have an intelligent acquaintance with the handwriting of the party so that he can
determine with a reasonable degree of certainty whether the writing offered is his genuine
handwriting.').
117 See note 113 supra.
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requisite," 8 and familiarity with handwriting may be acquired by seeing
some writing of the person in question." 9 In this instance it must be
proved that the witness has seen genuine specimens of the handwriting. 20
The authenticity of the specimens may be established by indirect as
well as direct evidence. It has thus been stated that when letters are
sent to a particular person on business matters and answers in due
course are received, there is a -fair inference that the answers were
"written by the person from whom they purport to come."' 2' Similarly,
the fact that the alleged writer of the paper in question paid a promissory note signed in his name, without explanation, is sufficient to
ascribe the authorship of the notes to him.' 22 The fact that the witness
acted upon a writing purporting to come from the person whose handwriting is in question is not sufficient to establish genuinenessma as it
only tends to prove that the witness believed the writing to be genuine.
The opinions of lay witnesses as to the genuineness of handwriting
are derived from a comparison of the writing in question with a mental
image of the handwriting of the person claimed to be the writer of the
disputed paper. 24 This method of identification has justly been decried.'25 The results of an experiment conducted in 1939 by the Direc118 Johnson v. Daverne, 19 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1821).
119 Sprague v. Sprague, 80 Hun 285, 30 N.Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Johnson v.
Daverne, 19 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1821).
120 Cunningham v. Hudson 'River Bank, 21 Wend. 557 (N.Y. 1839). Knowledge of
handwriting must be obtained ante litem motem. In re Burbank, 104 App. Div. 312, 93
N.Y. Supp. 866 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd, 185 N.Y. 559, 77 N.E. 1183 (1906).
121 Dunklin v. Riegelmann, 155 N.Y. Supp. 561, 562 (1st Dep't 1915); Cunningham
v. Hudson River Bank, 21 Wend. 557, 559 (N.Y. 1839); accord, Gross v. Sormani, 50
App. Div. 531, 64 N.Y. Supp. 300 (2d Dep't 1900); Hammond v. Varian, 54 N.Y. 398
(1873) (Witness who held note conceded to be genuine is a competent witness as to
genuineness of signature.).
122 Johnson v. Daverne, 19 Johns. 134 (N.Y. 1821); accord, Ely v. Stone, 173 Misc.
117, 17 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940) (Witness received signed check from
writer.); Armstrong v. Gargo, 8 Hun 175 (N.Y. 1876) (receipts).
123 Cunningham v. Hudson River Bank, 21 Wend. 557 (N.Y. 1839) (Bank employee
who had no knowledge other than that derived from signature on checks accepted by him
is not qualified to testify as to handwriting.); accord, Dunklin v. Riegelmann, 155 N.Y.
Supp. 561 (1st Dep't 1915) (Witness who had no means of knowing the handwriting of
person in question except from letters purported to have been written by her is not
competent to give evidence as to handwriting, where there was no evidence that letters
were written by the person in question or evidence of a course of correspondence between
witness and person in question.).
12 People v. Molineaux, 164 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 62 L.R.A. 103 (1901).
125 Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L. REv. 438, 443 (1939).
See also 7 WIGooE, EViDENCE §§ 694-96.
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tor of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory revealed
that handwriting identification by lay witnesses when accomplished by
means of a mental comparison is startlingly inaccurate, and it was concluded that this performance of mental gymnastics is "too unreliable
to be considered acceptable as, legal evidence."' 12 6 Despite the publica-

tion of the results of this experiment, the judicial recognition of 'the
unreliability of such evidence,' 27 and the decreased necessity therefor," 2
the principle of admissibility of lay opinions to prove the genuineness
of handwriting remains firmly entrenched in the law of this state.

C.

Value

Over one hundred years ago a damage suit was brought against a
man who had killed plaintiff's setter dog, and witnesses acquainted with
the qualities and market value of setters were permitted to testify to
the value of this species of dog. The court regarded this evidence as
"barely competent" but found that its admission did not constitute
error.' 29 Since that case the New York courts, recognizing that a description of property is not sufficient to give the jury a knowledge of
value, have permitted qualified lay witnesses to give their opinions as
to the value of property and also services.130
Deviations from simple value testimony are not permitted. 131 Thus
Inbau, supra note 125, at 443.
Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 14 N.Y. 439, 448 (1856) ("It is quite true that the proof
of handwriting by witnesses who have not seen the very paper written, is among the
most unsatisfactory parts of evidence, resting as it always does, upon presumptions of
greater or lesser infirmity.").
128 The genuineness of handwriting today is largely determined by experts. See for
examples In re Burbank, 104 App. Div. 312, 93 N.Y. Supp. 866 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd,
185 N.Y. 559, 77 N.E. 1183 (1906).
-129 Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354, 356 (N.Y. 1848).
130 Terwilliger v. Browning, King & Co., 193 App. Div. 628, 185 N.Y. Supp. 17 (3d
Dep't 1920) (rental); Blake v. Griswold, 103 N.Y. 429 (1886) (mining property); Merrill
v. Minturn, 30 N.Y. 594 (1864) (owner); Clark v. Baird, 9 N.Y. 183 (1853); joy v. Hopkins, 5 Wend. 84 (N.Y. 1847) (personalty); Howard v. Ins. Co., 4 Denio 507 (N.Y.
1847) (value of stock of goods) ; see Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio 373 (N.Y. 1847) (services) ;
Mayor v. Pentz, 24 Wend. 668, 674 (N.Y. 1840). Value testimony is not conclusive on
the jury. Peters v. Berkeley, 219 App. Div. 261, 219 N.Y. Supp. 709 (1st Dep't 1922).
131 States Import & Export Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 210 App. Div. 374, 206
N.Y. Supp. 323 (2d Dep't 1924) (Testimony as to amount of profits lost is inadmissable.);
Bookman v. N.Y. etc. R.R., 137 N.Y. 302, 33 N.E. 333 (1893) (Plaintiff's testimony that
if he could keep his right of action against defendant he would sell his property for
$25,000 was not a permissible estimate of value.). Cf. Wolper v. N.Y. Water Service Corp.,
276 App. Div. 1106, 99 N.Y.S.2d 647 (2d Dep't 1950) (Witness may not testify to net
worth of customer in absence of evidence of detiils of assets and liabilities and their
value.); Manning v. Maas, 2 Misc. 266, 21 N.Y. Supp. 959 (Ct. C.P. N.Y. City & County
1893) (Loss of profits is inadmissable without stating cost or value.).
126
127
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a witness may state the value of property before and after the act complained of, but he may not express an opinion as to what the value
would have been if the injury had not occurred.' 32 The grounds for such
holdings differ. Some courts have based their decisions on the theory
that such an estimate amounts to mere speculation. 3' Other courts
have felt that such estimates constitute an opinion on the amount of
damages sustained 3 4 and since it is well established that opinions on
damages are inadmissible such evidence is excluded.'3 5
Value testimony, although admitted as an exception to the general
136
rule and not because it is strictly a subject for expert testimony,
can be given only by a qualified witness"z as value testimony by an
incompetent witness would be of no help to the jury. The amount of
knowledge necessary to qualify a witness depends largely on the discretion of the trial judge.'
No rule of law specifies the amount of
knowledge a witness must have but it is generally held that the witness
must have some acquaintance with the particular property in question
as well as knowledge of its market value.'l Witnesses who testify to
the value of services must have some background of experience and
observation. 40
132 Charman v. Hibbler, 31 App. Div. 477, 52 N.Y. Supp. 212 (2d Dep't 1898); Roberts
v. N.Y. El. Ry., 128 N.Y. 455, 28 N.E. 486 (1891).
133 Roberts v. N.Y. El. Ry., 128 N.Y. 455, 28 N.E. 486 (1891).
134 Avery v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R., 121 N.Y. 31, 24 N.E. 20 (1890); Harger v. Edmonds,
4 Barb. 256 (N.Y. 1848).
13 Moran v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914), reversing
153 App. Div. 894, 137 N.Y. Supp. 1130 (Ist Dep't 1912); Hudson v. Caryl, 2 Thomp. &
C. 245 (N.Y. 1873); Teerpening v. Corn Exchange Ins. Co., 43 N.Y. 279 (1871); Fish
v. Dodge, 4 Denio 311 (N.Y. 1847). The reason for the rule has been stated in Roberts
v. N.Y. El. Ry., 128 N.Y. 455, 467, 28 N.E. 486, 488 (1891) ("the rule of damages is
a question of law, and the witness upon such a question might adopt a rule of his own,
and hold the defendant responsible beyond the legal measure"). Contra: Nellis v.
McCarn, 35 Barb. 115 (1861) (Opinion as to damages is admissable.); Rochester & S. R.R.
v. Budlong, 10 How. Pr. 289 (N.Y. 1854) (Opinion as to damages is admissable if based
on facts.). The last two cases have not been followed in New York.
136 RicunapnsoN, EviDENCE § 524 (7th ed. 1948).

137 Klein's Auto Delivery v. Super Garage, 91 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Glickstein & Terner Inc. v Sheffield Glass Bottle Co., 214 App. Div. 626, 212 N.Y. Supp. 444
(2d Dep't 1925).
138 In re Re-Bo Mfg. Co., 90 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see Bedell v. Long Island
R.R., 44 N.Y. 367, 4 Am. Rep. 688 (1871).
139 Bedell v. Long Island R.R., 44 N.Y. 367, 4 Am. Rep. 688 (1871); Clark v. Baird,
-9N.Y. 185 (1853); accord, Robertson v. Knapp, 35 N.Y. 91 (1866) (Farmers and residents
of neighborhood are competent witnesses to fix the price of land in neighborhood.).
Some courts require knowledge of cost as well as market value. Klein's Auto Delivery v.
Super Garage, 91 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Rademacher v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 75
Hun 83, 27 N.Y. Supp. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
140 Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Denio 373 (N.Y. 1897); Helmuth v. Apgar, 17 Misc. 623,
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D. Condition and Identity
A lay witness may testify not only to his own physical condition, but
when he has had an opportunity to observe he may state his opinion
as to the physical condition of another. 4' Statements dealing with
14
health, 142 illness, 4 3 suffering,'44 earning power," and intoxication,
are thus properly admissible. Opinions pertaining to subjects such as
the speed of a vehicle 47 or the depth of a hole 48 are proper subjects for
40 N.Y. Supp. 651 (Sup. Ct. 1896). Speculative conclusions as to services are not admissable. Berla v. Zambetti, 235 App. Div. 464, 257 N.Y. Supp. 179 (lst Dep't 1932) (future
earnings); accord, Heiman v. Greenberg, 162 N.Y. Supp. 931 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (amount
of goods that would have been sold if plaintiff was not discharged held inadmissable).
141 Vincent-Wilday Inc. v. Strait, 273 App. Div. 1054, 79 N.Y.S.2d 811 (4th Dep't
1948) (Witness was competent to testify as to his past and present condition and as to
his ability to work without being caused pain.); Pierpont v. Fifth Ave. Coach Co., 151
App. Div. 40, 135 N.Y. Supp. 322 (2d Dep't 1912).
142 Rawls v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N.Y. 282, 84 Am. Dec. 230 (1863)
(good
health and sound constitution).
143 Corbett v. City of Troy, 53 Hun 288, 6 N.Y. Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1889); accord,
Cannon v. Brooklyn City R.R., 9 Misc. 282, 29 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Brooklyn City Ct. 1894),
aff'd, 149 N.Y. 615, 44 N.E. 1121 (1896). A lay witness is sometimes permitted to state
whether a disease or disorder existed although the cases on this point are in conflict.
Compare Donovan v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1078 (Sup. Ct.
1900) (plaintiff competent to testify as to whether her brother had consumption); Duntzy
v. Cornelius Van Burne, 5 Hun 648 (N.Y. 1875) (witness permitted to testify that her
husband had a rupture); with Gray v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 175 N.Y. 448, 67 N.E.
899 (1903), reversing 72 App. Div. 424, 76 N.Y. Supp. 20 (2d Dep't 1902) (Plaintiff
could not characterize her injury as a "miscarriage."); Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 80 N.Y. 281 (1880) (Opinion that X suffered from consumption was inadmissable.).
144 McSwyny v. Broadway & S.A.R.R., 54 Hun 687, 7 N.Y. Supp. 456 (1889) (suffering
great pain); see Hagenlocker v. Coney Island v. Brooklyn R.R., 99 N.Y. 136, 138, 1
N.E. 536, 537 (1885).
145 Cass v. Third Ave. R.R., 20 App. Div. 591, 47 N.Y. Supp. 356 (2d Dep't 1897).
Transitions in physical condition may also be characterized. King v. Second Ave. R.R.,
75 Hun 17, 26 N.Y. Supp. 973 (Sup. Ct. 1894), aff'd, 148 N.Y. 739, 42 N.E. 724 (1896)
(worse); Staring v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Hun 606, 11 N.Y. Supp. 817 (Sup. Ct.
1890) (Testimony as to plaintiff's health before and after the accident was properly
admitted.).
146 Molissani v. Comadore Laundry Service Corp., 152 Misc. 270, 273 N.Y. Supp.
150 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Donahue v. Mengley, 220 App. Div. 469, 221 N.Y. Supp. 707 (4th
Dep't 1927); McCary v. Wells, 51 Hun 171, 4 N.Y. Supp. 672 (Sup. Ct. 1889); People
v. Eastwood, 14 N.Y. 563 (1856). The earlier cases admitted such evidence because it was
felt that it was impossible to give the jury a "living picture" without using opinions.
Recently a reversion in this theory of admission has become apparent as the cases now
require a witness to describe the motions, words and conduct of the person in question
before expressing an opinion as to whether that person was intoxicated. Compare People
v. Eastwood, supra with Molissani v. Comadore Laundry Service Corp., supra.
147 Marcucci v. Bird, 275 App. Div. 127, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 333 (3d Dep't 1949); Shulman
v. Roseth Corp., 227 App. Div. 577, 238 N.Y. Supp. 575 (1st Dep't 1930); Fisher v.
Union R.R., 86 App. Div. 365, 83 N.Y. Supp. 694 (2d Dep't 1903).
148 Miller v. City of N.Y., 104 App. Div. 33, 93 N.Y. Supp. 227 (2d Dep't 1905).
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lay witnesses. Similarly a witness may testify that something was wrong
with the "steering gear,"' 1 9 that a cab "stopped suddenly,"'150 that the
limb of a tree was dead,'' or that the noise and motion of a street car
5
was not of the usual kind.

2

Lay witnesses may not only testify to the identity of persons 1" and
common substances such as whiskey 5 or blood 5 5 but also to the resemblance between common objects. 56 However, opinion evidence of
the resemblance of a child to his supposed father, who is no longer
living, in order to prove paternity is not admissible,' 5 7 the reason for this
rule being stated in Re Wendel's Estate, as follows:
At most their statements [as to resemblance] were mere opinion. The
belief of a witness, though honest, as to the alleged resemblance may be
largely a matter of fancy or guess work. Moreover, in cases of claims to
estates, an impostor might well be selected who in some way resembled
the decedent. In my opinion the reception of testimony as 1to
resemblance,
particularly before a jury, would be extremely dangerous. 58
CONCLUSION

Despite the pressure of severe and frequent criticism for over half
a century, the opinion rule remains firmly entrenched in New York
law. A source of extensive disorder and uncertainty, the rule has given
'149 United States Casualty Co. v. Anderson Electric Car Co., 171 App. Div. 543, 157
N.Y. Supp. 710 (1st Dep't 1916).
150 Coleman v. Frank, 80 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd, 80 N.Y.S.2d
358 (2d Dep't 1948); accord, Fellows v. I.R.T. Co., 117 Misc. 64, 190 N.Y. Supp. 547
(Sup. Ct. 1921) (Car gave a "terrible and terrific jerk.").
151 Mosher v. State, 191 Misc. 804, 77 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1948). A lay witness
may be asked whether a structure "cut off any light." Nordlinger v. Manhattan Ry., 77
Hun 311, 28 N.Y. Supp. 361 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
152 Beers v. W. Side R.R., 101 App. Div. 308, 91 N.Y. Supp. 957 (3d Dep't 1905); accord,
Lombardi v. N.Y. State Rys., 224 App. Div. 438, 231 N.Y. Supp. 306 (4th Dep't 1928) (permissable to ask a witness whether a street car stopped in the usual and ordinary manner).
Statements such as the type in Lombardi v. N.Y. State Rys., supra, are sometimes referred
to as a shorthand rendering of the facts or a statement of collective facts.
153 See People v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 592, 605, 109 N.E. 618, 623 (1915). A person may
be identified by his voice, Calligan v. City of New York, 155 App. Div. 475, 140 N.Y.
Supp. 271 (2d Dep't 1913), or a dog by his bark, Wilbur v. Hubbard, 35 Barb. 303 (1861).
154 People v. Marx, 128 App. Div. 828, 112 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (2d Dep't 1908).

People v. Burgess, 153 N.Y. 561, 47 N.E. 889 (1897); People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y.
374 (1888); accord, King v. New York Central & H. RR., 72 N.Y. 607 (1878) (piece of
iron).
156 Hotchkiss v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 5 Hun 90 (1875) (footprint); Schwartz v.
Wood, 21 N.Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (bust).
.57 In re Wendel's Estate, 146 Misc. 260, 262 N.Y. Supp. 41, 95 A.L.R. 314 (Surr. Ct.
N.Y. County 1933).
158 Id. at 271, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 50-1.
'55
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rise to conflicting decisions and its application has been complicated
by the encrustation of myriad exceptions.
When any particular rule of law becomeg seriously whittled away
by exceptions and proves more confusing than helpful there is a manifest
need for the sharp blade of the legislator. It would seem that abolition
of the opinion rule would not only expedite the trial machinery but
would facilitate the search for truth and advance the cause of justice.

